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STATEMENT OF FACTS
UDOTfs Petition in this matter is replete with misstatements of fact. Because the problem extends beyond its Statement of Facts, several corrections will be noted at this point;
others will be covered subsequently in this brief.
UDOT's references that a "full evidentiary trial11 (Pet.2)
and a "full presentation of evidence by both sides" (Pet. 1)
took place at the District Court trial are certainly inappropriate and incorrect inasmuch as its counsel removed from
the Court and denied

Judge Hyde access to critical Exhibits

D-14, D-15 and D-16; likewise,its statement that another District
Court trial

(the Toone case) involved the

"exact same issues"

(Pet. 5) is not so, as the Court of Appeals noted in its decision,
and the further statement that "Toonefs interest
involved in that litigation) was terminated..."

(in the property
(Pet. 4) is a

volunteered and disputed conclusion immaterial to this case.
The Record fails to give any support to UDOT's assertion
that Dansie was "the recorded owner" (Pet, 4) of the 24.41
acres contained in his "Warranty Deed to UDOT (Pet. 4--and
see Exh. P-12); actually, that deed described 18.00 acres
owned by Dansie (which was really in Davis Co.) and 6.41 acres
owned by Utah Sand & Gravel Co. (which, also, was located
-1-

south of the 18.00-acre tract in Davis County). See Exh. P-7.
UDOT asserts that these Respondents,

as plaintiffs below,

also sued Davis and Weber Counties in this Cuiet Title action
(Pet. 4 ) . The Record is otherwise: Only UDOT was a named defendant
(R. 1-5); but it was UDOT^s a Third-Party Plaintiff, which in
turn sued

Davis County, Weber County and Dansie as Third-Party

Defendants. Also, the Court of Appeals decision did not "conclude
that a metes and bounds description existed of the location of the
main channel of the Weber River prior to 1894" as asserted by
UDOT (Pet. 10).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
UDOT'S PETITION CONSISTS OF NOTHING MORE THAN AN ATTEMPT
TO ADVANCE THE SAME ERRONEOUS LEGAL CLAIMS AND TO
MISREPRESENT THE FACTS IN AN EFFORT TO RE-ARGUE ITS CASE
UNDER THE GUISE OF A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
This litigation focuses on a 6.00-acre tract of land purchased
by

respondent Baxter and others at a Davis County tax sale. The

subject property is located on a delta area

at the mouth of Weber

Canyon where the westerly flowing Weber River emerges from the
canyon.

Interstate Freeway 1-84 and the main line of the Union

Pacific Railroad also traverse the area in a westerly direction
from the mouth of the canyon. The territorial legislature of Utah
-2~

established the boundary line between Weber and Davis Counties
in that area as being the main channel of the Weber River.
Petitioner UDOT contends that the 6.00-acre tract is in
Weber County and that Davis County had no authority to tax
and sell the land because it was located in Weber County. The
Weber River now flows on the south side of the subject property,
but Respondents contend that, at the time the boundary line was
established and at least until diverted by a manmade dike sometime after 1886 and before 1894, the Weber River was flowing
in its entirety on the north side of the subject property,
thereby placing the land in Davis County. Thus, the critical
issue in this case can be simply stated:
At the time the territorial legislature established
the boundary between Weber and Davis counties to be
the main channel of the Weber River, was the subject
property located north (Weber County side) or south
(Davis County side) of the river.
It was brought out at the trial through the testimony of
four surveyors on both sides (R.580-581, Tr. 27-28; 629,
Tr. 76; 646-647, Tr.93-94; and 709-710, Tr. 156-157) that
their interpretations of three official surveys made in
1855, 1871 and 1866 by the U.S. Surveyor General) Exhs. P-15,
P-16 and P-17) placed the entire flow of the Weber River in
-3-

all of those years at a basic location north of subject property
and that the surveys (which ran at approximately right angles to
the westerly gradient of the area lands) extended more than 700
feet south of the-present location of the Weber River without
really revealing so much as a dry channel which might have
suggested an ancient river flow.
UDOT prevailed upon Judge Hyde, who heard the case without
a jury, to rule in its favor because these Respondents had not
located an "exact11 location of the original channel of the Weber
River by a "metes-and-boundsff description.
Judge Hyde was further restricted in arriving at his decision
because UDOT's counsel purposely removed (R. 581-583) three
critical Exhibits

(D-14-D-15 and D-16)

from the courtroom and

took them to his office, and Judge Hyde never actually saw them
nor did he have them in his possession while having the case
under advisement. Those Exhibits, which were also made from the
official

U. S. government surveys by the Surveyor General in

the years 1855, 1871 and 1886, all located the entire flow of
the Weber River to the north of the subject tract.
In an argument before Judge Hyde after this matter

had

gone up on appeal, wherein the issue related to the three
missing exhibits which UD0Tfs counsel removed from the Court,
Mr. Ward made the following admission:

-4-

MR. FULLER: Now, generally when we have these river
boundary situations, we determine where is the main channel.
In this case, however, the main channel is mute (sic). Both
by these three exhibits and by the testimony and admissions
of their three experts, as well as my man, Mr. Baxter, all
of the channels were north of this property in 1866 and therefs
no Court, therefs nobody that can get around that.
MR. WARD: Your Honor, we're not objecting to that.
Thatfs so -MR. FULLER: Then they have no case. (R. 576-577)
Also, in an argument before the Court of Appeals, counsel
for UDOT again admitted that the entire flow of the river
was north of the subject property prior to 1886, but continued
to maintain (as he now does-- (Pet. 2, 8 and 10)) that these
Respondents had failed to establish an "exact" location of
the main channel of the river by a "metes and bounds" description. The Court of Appeals rejected UDOT's argument, recognizing (among other reasons) that the issue of where the center
line of the main channel of the river may have been located
was immaterial to its decision once it had been agreed by
everyone that the entire flow of the river was north of the
subject property when the county lines were established.

-5-

UDOT contended (and now contends) that a joint survey
along the Weber River channel (in its diverted location) made
by both counties in 1894, invoked a special statutory provision
for the establishment of disputed or uncertain county boundaries,
claiming that "in 1893 a definite uncertainty existed as to the
location of the main channel of the Weber River"(Pet. 3 ) . Here,
too, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the survey was not
conducted to resolve a dispute and that, even if such had occurred,
UDOT is back to square one since Utah court decisions and established boundary-line law placed the factual determination to which
the surveyors must adhere right back to the date when the territorial

legislature established the boundary line between the two

counties--not 1894.
UDOT further contends in Point II of its Petition that the
Court of Appeals "wrongfully concluded" that a 1946 Quiet Title
action placed the subject 6.00 acres in Davis County, relying on
a self-serving "map" which it prepared and which purportedly
showed the properties to be located in both counties.

But it shoxild

be pointed out that UD0Tfs "Exhibit C" was not a trial exhibit;
it was prepared by UDOT long before trial as part of a Motion for
Summary Judgment.

Further, the "Exhibit C" did not show the

location of the Weber River through the SW% of Section 25. The
Decree , a certified copy of which is found in the record, reads
as follows:
-6-

The property affected by this decree lying in the County
of Weber, State of Utah, is bounded and described as follows,
to-wit:
That portion of the Southwest Quarter of Section
25, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake
Meridian, U.S. Survey, lying North of Weber
River and South of the Union Pacific Railroad
Company's right-of-way.

The property affected by this decree lying in the
County of Davis, State of Utah, is bounded and described
as follows, to-wit;
The South One-half of the North Half of the Southwest Quarter of Section 25, and the Southeast
Ouarter of the Southeast Quarter of Section 25,
Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian,
U. S. Survey.
JOHN A. HENDRICKS.
District Judge
(R. 406)
(Underlining added)
The 1946 Quiet Title Decree didn't attempt to locate
the meander of the "old" channel
traversed the S%

of the Weber River as it

of the N% of the SW% of Sec. 25 as estab-

lished by the territorial legislature, so the Davis County
Assessor proceeded to do so by preparing a detailed Plat
Map (found in its Recorder's Office) which showed the "old11
channel of the river, outlined in color, as it traversed

the SE% and SW% of Section 25. From the area in the S % of
the N% of SW%, Davis County determined that

18.00 acres lay

within its jurisdiction, and it taxed the land continuously
since at least 1946 and until sold for taxes. The Plat Map
was offered and received in evidence without objection at
the trial-- Exh. P-7.
The Court of Appeals did not commit error in disregarding
UD0Tfs interpretation of the 1946 Quiet Title action
self-serving, incomplete and erroneous

lf

and its

Exhibit C.

UDOT next contends that the Court of Appeals erred in
refusing to

bifurcate the

case, thus denying it an oppor-

tunity to litigate the issue of the tax sale proceedings and,
apparently other defenses also raised in its Answer and ThirdParty Complaint. At the outset, these Respondents take

issue

with UD0Tfs assertion (Pet. 5) that "it was always assumed by
the parties that the present action would ...be bifurcated.ff
No such understanding ever existed; no such assumption can be
made from the Record in this case, or otherwise. The Record can
be carefully searched without finding anything wherein these
Respondents acknowledged or intimated anything other than that
the trial before Judge Hyde included all issues, just as Judge
Roth outlined them at Pretrial (R. 20--37-44).

Respondents argued

at the trial level that title should be quieted in them, and
they prayed for the same relief in their appeal brief.
-8-

Contrary to UDOTfs statement in its Petition at page 4,
these Respondents did not sue Davis County and Weber County«,
Respondents filed their Complaint

(R. 1-5) solely against

UDOT; thereafter, UDOT, as a Third-Party Plaintiff, sued
Dansie (its grantor) and both Weber and Davis counties, as
Third-Party Defendants.
Pretrial

(See caption of this action and the

transcript Exh. P-20 at

Pp 3-4,10-11,15-16, 19)

UDOT specifically sued Davis County, seeking relief, if
Baxters should recover from UDOT, "equal to the fair market value
value of the subject property ".because "Davis County did not
follow the necessary statutory procedures to sell the property
even if it was located in Davis County," and to "void out
the tax deed."
Curiously, at Pretrial it became evident from the abovereferenced transcript citations
Davis County had reached a

that UDOT, Weber County and

mutual accommodation and that an

understanding existed whereby UDOT would not pursue the tax
sale matter against Davis County.
that both Weber and Davis counties

This, notwithstanding
had filed their Answers

to the Third-Party Complaint joining issue with UDOT. During
the trial before Judge Hyde, UDOT's counsel was flanked at
counsel table by counsel representing both counties, and
they now represent both counties on UDOT's appeal
-9-

brief and

on this Petition.
Under the circumstances, it seems unusual that UDOT should
now seek to challenge the Davis County tax sale proceedings.
Somehow, it would appear that UDOT and Davis County may have
compromised their positions; in any event, any proceeding
attacking the Davis County tax sale would undoubtedly be highly prejudicial to these Respondents at this point and the
situation would certainly raise serious questions of due
process.
UDOT did not pursue its Third Party Complaint against
Dansie--not even to the point of seeking a reformation of
its invalid deed (which UDOT prepared). Consequently, it does not
have legal title (i.e.,a record title supported by a chain of
title). See

H.O.L.C. v. Dudleyq05 U.208,141 P.2d 160 (1943) and

Mercur Coalition Min. Co. v. Cannon, 112 U. 13,184 P.2d 341
(1947). The weakness of its title wonft prevail against parties
(Respondents here) who make out a prima facie case by introducing their tax title in evidence (Exhs. 2,3, 4 and 5).

See

Smith v. Nelson, 114 U. 51, 197 P.2d 132 (1948)•
If the Davis County tax sale were to be declared void and
invalid simply because the land may have been located in Weber
County, by the same logic--and consistent with the concept of
mutuality of remedy--UDOTfs Weber County-ownership deed, departing
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from a Davis County chain of title, would hardly seem to be
an adequate basis to attack a Davis County tax title.

POINT II
WHETHER THE TERRITORIAL LEGISLATURE ESTABLISHED THE
CHANNEL OF THE WEBER RIVER AS THE DIVISION LINE
BETWEEN WEBER AND DAVIS COUNTIES IN 1866 OR IN 1855
IS AN IMMATERIAL FACTOR IN THE DECISION OF THE COURT
OF APPEALS.
Once recognized that the territorial legislature
established the main channel of the Weber River as the
boundary line between the two counties, the only difference
that using the year 1866 (the

date used at trial) or 1855

(as determined by the Court of Appeals) could possibly have
on the outcome of the litigation

would be if the river!s

main channel was located south of the subject property in
1855.

That the river was north of the subject property in

the same area without substantial deviation at the time of
the 1855, 1871 and 1886 surveys was recognized by UDOT's
three appraisers and respondent
UDOT's witness

Ronald Baxter:

Max B. Elliott,Davis County Surveyor--

Q. My other question, in any of the surveys conducted
by the United States Surveyor General, in either
1855, 1871 or 1886, did you find in any of those
surveys, any water of the Weber River located
south of the Baxter tract shown on Exhibit P i ?
A. Not on those notes.
-11-

Qe

A.

On those notes. And until 1894, you found no
indication of water south of the tract until that
f
94 survey came about, did you?
I found nothing on that prior to the 1894 survey,
thatfs correct.
(Tr. 27-28 — R. 580-581)

UD0Tfs witness John P. Reeve, Weber County Surveyors'. But you didn't find any water as of 1855 or 1871
flowing on the south of this property, did you?
A.

No.
(Tr. 76 —

R. 629)

UD0Tfs witness Jack L. DeMass, an engineer and surveyor —
Q.

All right. Did you find anything in the Surveyor
Generalfs notes to indicate that there were old
channels south of the channel located some 22 chains
north of the section comer of this southwest corner?

A.

No.

Q.

No channels were indicated, were they?

A.

No.
(Tr. 93-94—R. 646-647)

Plaintiff Ronald L. Baxter, an engineer and surveyor—
Q.

Now some general questions. On the three surveys that
you ran or that the government ran, excuse me, and
that you plotted, did you find any river indication
that was common to all three surveys?

A.

Yes. The area at approximately 34 and a half chains
showed the main channel of the Weber River on all three
surveys with slight variance.
(Tr. 156-157--R.709-710)

-12-

Q.

Now, as you have reviewed the survey notes for
all the years,was there any indication up through
1886, that there was any portion of the Weber
River at a point roughly 715 feet north of the
southwest quarter of section 25.

A.

No,there was no river in that location at that time.

0.

None at all?
(Tr. 158--R.711)

The official U. S. survey notes and~the map taken
therefrom, as prepared by the Surveyor General, establish
beyond any doubt that the Weber River was north of the
subject property in the year 1855. Exhs. D-14 and P-16
accurately reflect the situation in the year 1855 and
leave no room for error.
The subject property was located in Davis County in 1855.
SUMMARY
UDOT concludes its argument seeking a writ by suggesting
that "something was presented to the Court of Appeals that
created some sort of bias or prejudice in this case11 (Pet. 10).
If that Courtfs refusal to accept UD0Tfs unsupported and selfmade concepts of county boundary-line law was intended by the
quoted statement, it is understandable that the Court of
Appeals might ultimately lose patience with UD0Tfs obdurant
refusal to accept rather simple and logical legal principles
applicable to this case. But the quoted statement undoubtedly
was really intended as an oblique reference to <the "inex-13-

plicable,f personal conduct of UDOTfs counsel in withholding
critical

Exhibits D-14, D-15 and D-16 until directed to do so

by the Court of Appeals after oral argument. Such conduct must
certainly be annoying to any court, especially when it emanates
from Utah's highest governmental legal staff.
Nor was the author of this brief, as counsel for Respondents,
pleased with the attempt by UDOT's counsel to shift the blame for
the disappearance of the missing Exhibits to the undersigned
(Transcript-R. 567-581) or the reference—a single case citation —
in the Petition to the case of UDOT v. Glen E. Fuller, et al.,
603 P.2d 814, which contained no legal principle relevant to this
case (Pet.6), but, instead, was obviously intended by Mr. Ward to
convey some subliminal message to this Court.
Under the circumstances, Mr. Ward's removal and withholding
of the three critical Exhibits from two courts can only be considered as an admission that UDOT had no case and that he was
deliberately attempting to thwart justice. The critical comment
made by the Court of Appeals relating to such conduct was certainly
justified.
Nor does counselfs conduct find justification as some kind
of mistake or first-time occurrence. In the case of UDOT v. Rayco
Corporation.599 P.2d 481 ( Utah - 1979), a condemnation case in
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Weber County,where the property owner was represented by
another member of the Utah Bar, Mr. Ward removed critical
evidence from the trial court under circumstances substantially similar to what occurred in this case. This Court
in that case, referring to Mr. Ward's actions ( p.491),
commented at length, stating that ffThe actions of State
counsel cannot be condoned11 and that "it is not within the
ambit of his duty to engage in deceitful or oppressive tactics
to deprive a condemnee of his constitutional right of just
cotobe?isation, Art. I,Sec. 22, Constitution of Utah.11
Utah Sand & Gravel Co. (now Monroe, Inc.) will undoubtedly seek to quiet title to the 6.41 acres included in the 24.41acre description contained in the defective deed from Dansie
to UDOT, using its own counsel. Otherwise, there is nothing
in the Record to suggest that "utter chaos11 will exist if the
decision of the Court of Appeals is upheld, as Petitioner
contends (Pet.11).
This is not a case which even remotely meets the discretionary guidelines for review set forth in Rule 43 of the
Rules of the Supreme Court.
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CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted3

GLEN E. FULLER
Attorney for Respondents
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